Page 94 - Mellinato, Giulio, and Aleksander Panjek. Eds. 2022. Complex Gateways. Labour and Urban History of Maritime Port Cities: The Northern Adriaticin a Comparative Perspective. Koper: University of Primorska Press.
P. 94
plex Gateways
jected (Magnien 1804, 30; Launay 1792). Indeed, he came to the conclu-
sion that:
Il y a peu de pays en effet, auquel il convienne aujourd’hui plus qu’à la
France, de multiplier ses ports francs, elle a besoin, non point e faire
elle-même le commerce de transport, mais qu’on le fasse pour elle. […]
C’est notre intérêt encore d’attirer les capitalistes étrangers dans nos
port. […] Bientôt les marchands qui se domicilieraient dans nos ports,
compareraient les profits de leur commerce, avec ceux qu’on pourrait
attendre du perfectionnement de nos manufactures ou de notre agri-
culture […] les capitaux des Anglais seraient bientôt destinés à met-
tre en mouvement une industrie toute française. (pp. 439–41)
In short, Sismondi proposed to create a system of free ports (Antwerp,
Dunkirk, L’Orient, La Rochelle, Bayonne, and Marseille), considering it
one of the few effective (and therefore justified) governmental interven-
tions in the economic field. In the same year, Jean-Baptiste Say published
his Traité d’économie politique in which, in contrast, he defended the ab-
solute principle of free trade without privileges and rejected, as useless
and illegitimate, any government action aimed at regulating trade. In
May-June 1803, Say arrived at a real confrontation with Napoleon, fol-
lowing the failure of the peace of Amiens. Napoleon, in fact, was laying
the foundations of the continental blockade (Tarlé 1928; 1931; Crouzet
1964; Dufraisse 1966; Woolf 1990, 167; De Francesco 2011, 89–90; Grab
2015), with the well-known letters to the courts of Madrid, Naples, and
Florence requesting the closure of all ports to British products and ships.
With his reflections, although distant from pro-Napoleonic positions
and circles, Sismondi seems to have provided important theoretical bas-
es to Napoleon and his entourage (Chaptal, Collin de Sussy, Coquebert de
Montbret, Montgaillard) for the development of an economic policy. In
addition to measures dictated by the exceptionality of the moment (such
as the continental blockade of 1806), Napoleon and his entourage im-
agined the creation of a series of free ports (or rather entrepôts) at a global
level, to ensure that France had stable control over seas and trade, even in
peacetime. The model that Napoleon had in mind, however, was not that
of the free port tout court (such as Livorno or Trieste, in which the privi-
legies were extended to the whole city), but of the entrepôt or ‘free point’
as in Genoa, in which only one specific area of the port enjoyed customs
privileges. In this spirit, the free port of Genoa was preserved and a new
one was created in Venice, limited to the island of San Giorgio (Delogu
94
jected (Magnien 1804, 30; Launay 1792). Indeed, he came to the conclu-
sion that:
Il y a peu de pays en effet, auquel il convienne aujourd’hui plus qu’à la
France, de multiplier ses ports francs, elle a besoin, non point e faire
elle-même le commerce de transport, mais qu’on le fasse pour elle. […]
C’est notre intérêt encore d’attirer les capitalistes étrangers dans nos
port. […] Bientôt les marchands qui se domicilieraient dans nos ports,
compareraient les profits de leur commerce, avec ceux qu’on pourrait
attendre du perfectionnement de nos manufactures ou de notre agri-
culture […] les capitaux des Anglais seraient bientôt destinés à met-
tre en mouvement une industrie toute française. (pp. 439–41)
In short, Sismondi proposed to create a system of free ports (Antwerp,
Dunkirk, L’Orient, La Rochelle, Bayonne, and Marseille), considering it
one of the few effective (and therefore justified) governmental interven-
tions in the economic field. In the same year, Jean-Baptiste Say published
his Traité d’économie politique in which, in contrast, he defended the ab-
solute principle of free trade without privileges and rejected, as useless
and illegitimate, any government action aimed at regulating trade. In
May-June 1803, Say arrived at a real confrontation with Napoleon, fol-
lowing the failure of the peace of Amiens. Napoleon, in fact, was laying
the foundations of the continental blockade (Tarlé 1928; 1931; Crouzet
1964; Dufraisse 1966; Woolf 1990, 167; De Francesco 2011, 89–90; Grab
2015), with the well-known letters to the courts of Madrid, Naples, and
Florence requesting the closure of all ports to British products and ships.
With his reflections, although distant from pro-Napoleonic positions
and circles, Sismondi seems to have provided important theoretical bas-
es to Napoleon and his entourage (Chaptal, Collin de Sussy, Coquebert de
Montbret, Montgaillard) for the development of an economic policy. In
addition to measures dictated by the exceptionality of the moment (such
as the continental blockade of 1806), Napoleon and his entourage im-
agined the creation of a series of free ports (or rather entrepôts) at a global
level, to ensure that France had stable control over seas and trade, even in
peacetime. The model that Napoleon had in mind, however, was not that
of the free port tout court (such as Livorno or Trieste, in which the privi-
legies were extended to the whole city), but of the entrepôt or ‘free point’
as in Genoa, in which only one specific area of the port enjoyed customs
privileges. In this spirit, the free port of Genoa was preserved and a new
one was created in Venice, limited to the island of San Giorgio (Delogu
94
