Page 55 - Dark Shades of Istria
P. 55
3.3 Linking Memory with Culture and Politics
holocaust, which is very characteristic of the (post)communist states.¹⁶
In the (non-communist) Italian example it assumes specific forms and
aims to shape the legacy of conflicts in the Upper Adriatic with the focus
on the foibe – exodus sequence. In this discourse, Italians see themselves
only as an innocent victim (Altin & Badurina, 2017, p. 324; Hrobat Vir-
loget & Čebron Lipovec, 2017, p. 49; Orlić, 2012, p. 14; 2015, p. 477); they
feel as victims of the communists or Tito’s terror. Mercy automatically as-
signs victims to their dominant culture. Generally (non-religious), this is
also a typical view of the holocaust/shoah, which is, however, difficult to
generalise and link with the Italians as victims (Accati, 2009, pp. 188–189).
What does this mean in the case of Istrian Italians? Based on the Christian
paradigm, persecutions and executions of Italians are often understood
as a ‘group Christ’s passion and crucifixion.’ The victims of this said ori-
gin thus become ‘victims par excellence’ (such as the sacrifice of Jesus
Christ in Christianity). This symbolical reliance on the biblical story of
Jesus Christ, who was falsely accused and then crucified (murdered), is
certainly highly questionable in the case of Istria, which previously expe-
rienced the brutality of Italian fascism.¹⁷ In any case, generalisations and
manipulations should be avoided. Civilisational norms, such as the right
to burial, the grave and memory, should be preserved.
Under these circumstances, more effort is needed to overcome the time
of memory as a sort of mourning in order to achieve ‘only memory,’ the
right degree of amnesia and reconciliation with others and with ourselves
(Ricoeur, 2012). However, it is necessary to be aware that, in addition to
the ‘different national histories’¹⁸ and systematic damnatio memoriae, a
balanced integration of memory, amnesia, silence¹⁹ and reconciliation is
also extremely difficult due to different past and present ideological (po-
litical) views and socio-political systems. Political establishments in the
wider region have a great role in enforcing policies that include tolerance,
integration, inclusion, co-operation, coexistence, etc. In this context, the
aspect of (political) power should be emphasised in relation to memory
– see Benčić (2016, pp. 11–12).
¹⁶ More can be found in Jambrešić Kirin (2004).
¹⁷ Se also Accati (2009).
¹⁸ Different academic interpretations of the past exist in the Upper Adriatic – see Franzinetti
(2014) or Verginella (2009a; 2009b; 2010).
¹⁹ More can be found in Vinitzky-Seroussi and Teeger (2010), Hrobat Virgolet (2017) or
Hrobat Virgolet and Čebron Lipovec (2017).
55
holocaust, which is very characteristic of the (post)communist states.¹⁶
In the (non-communist) Italian example it assumes specific forms and
aims to shape the legacy of conflicts in the Upper Adriatic with the focus
on the foibe – exodus sequence. In this discourse, Italians see themselves
only as an innocent victim (Altin & Badurina, 2017, p. 324; Hrobat Vir-
loget & Čebron Lipovec, 2017, p. 49; Orlić, 2012, p. 14; 2015, p. 477); they
feel as victims of the communists or Tito’s terror. Mercy automatically as-
signs victims to their dominant culture. Generally (non-religious), this is
also a typical view of the holocaust/shoah, which is, however, difficult to
generalise and link with the Italians as victims (Accati, 2009, pp. 188–189).
What does this mean in the case of Istrian Italians? Based on the Christian
paradigm, persecutions and executions of Italians are often understood
as a ‘group Christ’s passion and crucifixion.’ The victims of this said ori-
gin thus become ‘victims par excellence’ (such as the sacrifice of Jesus
Christ in Christianity). This symbolical reliance on the biblical story of
Jesus Christ, who was falsely accused and then crucified (murdered), is
certainly highly questionable in the case of Istria, which previously expe-
rienced the brutality of Italian fascism.¹⁷ In any case, generalisations and
manipulations should be avoided. Civilisational norms, such as the right
to burial, the grave and memory, should be preserved.
Under these circumstances, more effort is needed to overcome the time
of memory as a sort of mourning in order to achieve ‘only memory,’ the
right degree of amnesia and reconciliation with others and with ourselves
(Ricoeur, 2012). However, it is necessary to be aware that, in addition to
the ‘different national histories’¹⁸ and systematic damnatio memoriae, a
balanced integration of memory, amnesia, silence¹⁹ and reconciliation is
also extremely difficult due to different past and present ideological (po-
litical) views and socio-political systems. Political establishments in the
wider region have a great role in enforcing policies that include tolerance,
integration, inclusion, co-operation, coexistence, etc. In this context, the
aspect of (political) power should be emphasised in relation to memory
– see Benčić (2016, pp. 11–12).
¹⁶ More can be found in Jambrešić Kirin (2004).
¹⁷ Se also Accati (2009).
¹⁸ Different academic interpretations of the past exist in the Upper Adriatic – see Franzinetti
(2014) or Verginella (2009a; 2009b; 2010).
¹⁹ More can be found in Vinitzky-Seroussi and Teeger (2010), Hrobat Virgolet (2017) or
Hrobat Virgolet and Čebron Lipovec (2017).
55
