Page 357 - Panjek, Aleksander, Jesper Larsson and Luca Mocarelli, eds. 2017. Integrated Peasant Economy in a Comparative Perspective: Alps, Scandinavia and Beyond. Koper: University of Primorska Press
P. 357
peasant economy in interwar slovenia – policies of income diversification
As indicated above, the structural inconsistencies of Slovenian agri-
culture were also reflected by the high indebtedness of the farming popula-
tion, which was also the result of the destructive consequences of the Great
Depression that saw agricultural prices decrease by up to 50%. The indebt-
edness was a reflection of the Slovenian agriculture in general, as the ranks
of the indebted were dominated by small farms that were unable to meet
the standards of a market economy. That is to say, the indebtedness was an
indication of the market-driven size optimisation of Slovenian farms.
Looking at the data on the holdings of indebted farms, we see that over
60% of all indebted farms held less than 10 ha of land. The percentage be-
comes even more significant once it is accompanied by the conclusions of
the cost-effectiveness analysis. The economic survival of farms with less
than five ha of land in the 1920s was impossible, which forced the owners
to look for other sources of income. As the crisis broke out, this category
expanded to include farms up to 10 ha in size, which had previously, in the
first decade of the Yugoslav state, been able to cover all their expenses ex-
clusively through farming. The data of the 1931 census, clearly showed that
slightly over 20% of all farms only pursued farming as a secondary activity
(Maister 1938, 94). This share is numerically quite similar to the percentage
of indebted farms with less than 10 ha of land. We can thus conclude that
the optimal size of a farm, allowing for specialisation of production and not
only for survival but also, to a certain extent, for accumulation, already ex-
ceeded 10 ha in the 1930s.
Naturally, such trends threatened great economic, social and political
upheavals, with the true extent of the problem being revealed by the tell-
ing fact that as much as 3/4 of all peasants in the Slovenian countryside sus-
tained their families on farms with less than 10 ha of land. Moreover, this
was certainly a population much too large for the government to remain
indifferent and not intervene. Intervention was made even more necessary
by the fact that these multitudes could not emigrate or seek employment in
industry. The promulgation of the Peasant’s Protection Act (Zakon o zašči-
ti kmetov) and the moratorium on agricultural debts in 1932 and subse-
quent legislation essentially preserved the existing fragmented land hold-
ing structure (Lazarević 1994).
We must ask ourselves, however, whether a different outcome was even
possible. A large number of unsuccessful auctions in the 1930s indicates
that even large holdings, whose income had decreased by up to 50% due
to the crisis, did not possess sufficient funds to purchase these bankrupt-
355
As indicated above, the structural inconsistencies of Slovenian agri-
culture were also reflected by the high indebtedness of the farming popula-
tion, which was also the result of the destructive consequences of the Great
Depression that saw agricultural prices decrease by up to 50%. The indebt-
edness was a reflection of the Slovenian agriculture in general, as the ranks
of the indebted were dominated by small farms that were unable to meet
the standards of a market economy. That is to say, the indebtedness was an
indication of the market-driven size optimisation of Slovenian farms.
Looking at the data on the holdings of indebted farms, we see that over
60% of all indebted farms held less than 10 ha of land. The percentage be-
comes even more significant once it is accompanied by the conclusions of
the cost-effectiveness analysis. The economic survival of farms with less
than five ha of land in the 1920s was impossible, which forced the owners
to look for other sources of income. As the crisis broke out, this category
expanded to include farms up to 10 ha in size, which had previously, in the
first decade of the Yugoslav state, been able to cover all their expenses ex-
clusively through farming. The data of the 1931 census, clearly showed that
slightly over 20% of all farms only pursued farming as a secondary activity
(Maister 1938, 94). This share is numerically quite similar to the percentage
of indebted farms with less than 10 ha of land. We can thus conclude that
the optimal size of a farm, allowing for specialisation of production and not
only for survival but also, to a certain extent, for accumulation, already ex-
ceeded 10 ha in the 1930s.
Naturally, such trends threatened great economic, social and political
upheavals, with the true extent of the problem being revealed by the tell-
ing fact that as much as 3/4 of all peasants in the Slovenian countryside sus-
tained their families on farms with less than 10 ha of land. Moreover, this
was certainly a population much too large for the government to remain
indifferent and not intervene. Intervention was made even more necessary
by the fact that these multitudes could not emigrate or seek employment in
industry. The promulgation of the Peasant’s Protection Act (Zakon o zašči-
ti kmetov) and the moratorium on agricultural debts in 1932 and subse-
quent legislation essentially preserved the existing fragmented land hold-
ing structure (Lazarević 1994).
We must ask ourselves, however, whether a different outcome was even
possible. A large number of unsuccessful auctions in the 1930s indicates
that even large holdings, whose income had decreased by up to 50% due
to the crisis, did not possess sufficient funds to purchase these bankrupt-
355
