Page 22 - Hojnik, Jana. 2017. In Persuit of Eco-innovation. Drivers and Consequences of Eco-innovation at Firm Level. Koper: University of Primorska Press
P. 22
In Pursuit of Eco-innovation
den Bergh et al. 2011). This would lead to reduced social costs, while the
private costs would increase (van den Bergh et al. 2011). Van den Bergh et
al. (2011) argue that the cost structure becomes more incentive compat-
ible and tends to improve the likelihood of eco-innovations when exter-
nal (social) costs are translated into private ones through a public poli-
cy (regulation of the environmental externality). Hence, eco-innovations
are increasingly at the center of the policy action, and therefore a crucial
question pertaining to eco-innovations regards whether or not they ac-
tually require a specific theory and policy (Rennings 2000; De Marchi
2012). Other important characteristics that differentiate eco-innovation
from regular innovation are that eco-innovation is not an open-ended
concept and that eco-innovation explicitly pinpoints reduction of envi-
ronmental impacts, whether these are intentional or not (Kemp and Fox-
22 on 2007; Arundel and Kemp 2009; OECD 2009; Machiba 2010; Fawzi
and Rundquist 2011; Rave et al. 2011; Fleiter et al. 2012; Horbach, Ram-
mer and Rennings 2012; Antonioli, Mancinelli, and Mazzanti 2013; Ca-
inelli and Mazzanti 2013).
The existing literature (especially neoclassical contributions) focuses
on and emphasizes two main aspects that differentiate eco-innovations
from other innovations (De Marchi 2012). These two aspects concern
their externalities and drivers (see Table 1), which has already pointed
out Rennings (2000), who named them the “double externality problem”
and “the regulatory push/pull effect”. The double externality problem is
one of the most important and well-known peculiarities of environmen-
tal innovations and regards production of the common spillovers of in-
novations in general and at the same time creation of less environmental
external costs (Rennings 2000; Ziegler and Rennings 2004; Rennings et
al. 2006). This means that the whole society exploits the benefits from an
environmental innovation, while a single company carries all the costs by
itself (Ziegler and Rennings 2004; Beise and Rennings 2005). Moreover,
even if a company successfully markets an environmental innovation, the
company’s appropriation of the profits for this innovation is difficult, es-
pecially if the access to the corresponding knowledge about this environ-
mental innovation is easily accessible to possible imitators and when en-
vironmental benefits result to have a good public character (Ziegler and
Rennings 2004; Beise and Rennings 2005). Researchers (Rennings 2000;
Ziegler and Rennings 2004) emphasize that the double externality prob-
lem leads to an increase of the importance of regulatory framework (be-
cause both externalities result in a suboptimal investment in environ-
mental innovations).
den Bergh et al. 2011). This would lead to reduced social costs, while the
private costs would increase (van den Bergh et al. 2011). Van den Bergh et
al. (2011) argue that the cost structure becomes more incentive compat-
ible and tends to improve the likelihood of eco-innovations when exter-
nal (social) costs are translated into private ones through a public poli-
cy (regulation of the environmental externality). Hence, eco-innovations
are increasingly at the center of the policy action, and therefore a crucial
question pertaining to eco-innovations regards whether or not they ac-
tually require a specific theory and policy (Rennings 2000; De Marchi
2012). Other important characteristics that differentiate eco-innovation
from regular innovation are that eco-innovation is not an open-ended
concept and that eco-innovation explicitly pinpoints reduction of envi-
ronmental impacts, whether these are intentional or not (Kemp and Fox-
22 on 2007; Arundel and Kemp 2009; OECD 2009; Machiba 2010; Fawzi
and Rundquist 2011; Rave et al. 2011; Fleiter et al. 2012; Horbach, Ram-
mer and Rennings 2012; Antonioli, Mancinelli, and Mazzanti 2013; Ca-
inelli and Mazzanti 2013).
The existing literature (especially neoclassical contributions) focuses
on and emphasizes two main aspects that differentiate eco-innovations
from other innovations (De Marchi 2012). These two aspects concern
their externalities and drivers (see Table 1), which has already pointed
out Rennings (2000), who named them the “double externality problem”
and “the regulatory push/pull effect”. The double externality problem is
one of the most important and well-known peculiarities of environmen-
tal innovations and regards production of the common spillovers of in-
novations in general and at the same time creation of less environmental
external costs (Rennings 2000; Ziegler and Rennings 2004; Rennings et
al. 2006). This means that the whole society exploits the benefits from an
environmental innovation, while a single company carries all the costs by
itself (Ziegler and Rennings 2004; Beise and Rennings 2005). Moreover,
even if a company successfully markets an environmental innovation, the
company’s appropriation of the profits for this innovation is difficult, es-
pecially if the access to the corresponding knowledge about this environ-
mental innovation is easily accessible to possible imitators and when en-
vironmental benefits result to have a good public character (Ziegler and
Rennings 2004; Beise and Rennings 2005). Researchers (Rennings 2000;
Ziegler and Rennings 2004) emphasize that the double externality prob-
lem leads to an increase of the importance of regulatory framework (be-
cause both externalities result in a suboptimal investment in environ-
mental innovations).
