Page 115 - Mellinato, Giulio, and Aleksander Panjek. Eds. 2022. Complex Gateways. Labour and Urban History of Maritime Port Cities: The Northern Adriaticin a Comparative Perspective. Koper: University of Primorska Press.
P. 115
Trieste 1948–1952: A Contended Port City and the Marshall Plan
From this point of view, the management of the port issues could
also be interpreted as a test of the viability and practical applicability
of the entire strategy developed by the American military government
structure during the Marshall Plan years.
ERP and the Trieste port system: quantities and qualities
The Free Territory of Trieste became a late member of the OEEC. The
starting point was not an entirely local decision, but a request made
by the Italian ambassador, when Italy was already a member state. The
Italian representative asked for the recognition that the ‘The Italian
Government cannot indeed remain indifferent to the moral and the ma-
terial needs of the population of Venezia Julia, which by immemorial tra-
dition has closely participated in the development and achievements of
the European population.’7
The ERP in Trieste, therefore, was devised mainly as “compensation”
for a post-war settlement which (instrumentally or otherwise) was rec-
ognized as penalizing and worthy of an extraordinary remedy, while the
usual image of a push for triggering an autonomous recovery after the
war was left in the background.
This was the starting point of all the contradictions of the unusu-
al application of the Marshall Plan directives in Trieste. The main US
Congress law, the one igniting the complex procedures for the realization
of the European Recovery Program, clearly stated that:
The restoration or maintenance in European countries of principles of
individual liberty, free institutions, and genuine independence rests
largely upon the establishment of sound economic conditions, sta-
ble international economic relationship, and the achievement by the
countries of Europe of a healthy economy independent of extraordi-
nary outside assistance.8
Conversely, in Trieste the intervention perspectives remained much
more linked to the war logic than to those aimed at a peaceful integration
of Europe, and not only because of the exceptional duration of the allied
military government (Granger 2006, 38). One of the main problems, as
we will see, was the inability of the Allied officials to effectively imagine
7 IUE, OEEC, Memorandum Participation of Trieste in the European Recovery Pro-
gram, 1010 C(48) 080.
8 The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, Public law 472, 80th Congress, April 1948.
115
From this point of view, the management of the port issues could
also be interpreted as a test of the viability and practical applicability
of the entire strategy developed by the American military government
structure during the Marshall Plan years.
ERP and the Trieste port system: quantities and qualities
The Free Territory of Trieste became a late member of the OEEC. The
starting point was not an entirely local decision, but a request made
by the Italian ambassador, when Italy was already a member state. The
Italian representative asked for the recognition that the ‘The Italian
Government cannot indeed remain indifferent to the moral and the ma-
terial needs of the population of Venezia Julia, which by immemorial tra-
dition has closely participated in the development and achievements of
the European population.’7
The ERP in Trieste, therefore, was devised mainly as “compensation”
for a post-war settlement which (instrumentally or otherwise) was rec-
ognized as penalizing and worthy of an extraordinary remedy, while the
usual image of a push for triggering an autonomous recovery after the
war was left in the background.
This was the starting point of all the contradictions of the unusu-
al application of the Marshall Plan directives in Trieste. The main US
Congress law, the one igniting the complex procedures for the realization
of the European Recovery Program, clearly stated that:
The restoration or maintenance in European countries of principles of
individual liberty, free institutions, and genuine independence rests
largely upon the establishment of sound economic conditions, sta-
ble international economic relationship, and the achievement by the
countries of Europe of a healthy economy independent of extraordi-
nary outside assistance.8
Conversely, in Trieste the intervention perspectives remained much
more linked to the war logic than to those aimed at a peaceful integration
of Europe, and not only because of the exceptional duration of the allied
military government (Granger 2006, 38). One of the main problems, as
we will see, was the inability of the Allied officials to effectively imagine
7 IUE, OEEC, Memorandum Participation of Trieste in the European Recovery Pro-
gram, 1010 C(48) 080.
8 The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, Public law 472, 80th Congress, April 1948.
115
