Page 116 - Mellinato, Giulio, and Aleksander Panjek. Eds. 2022. Complex Gateways. Labour and Urban History of Maritime Port Cities: The Northern Adriaticin a Comparative Perspective. Koper: University of Primorska Press.
P. 116
plex Gateways
a stable positionality for the Trieste economic system inside the Western
area, while, on the other hand, both the Italian government and the lo-
cal Italian officials acted to subdue the local economy to certain Italian
needs, especially in the maritime sector. At the end, the ERP-Trieste pro-
ject was one of the most financed in Europe (on a per capita basis) but it
was quite completely fruitless in creating a self-sustained economy.
On the one hand, the Italian Government did not hesitate to hinder
or reject any initiative that did not fit into a national development plan
and had exclusively local values, to the detriment of the country’s inter-
est. On the other hand, it did not hesitate to support strong national and
local interests – such as public enterprises (Ilva, shipbuilding and ship-
ping firms), or monopoly groups (Italcementi) - to the detriment of small
and medium-sized industries:9 precisely the accusation that the Italian
government and the ECA mission in Rome levied against the AMG (Serra
1954).
After the plan started, the attitude of the American officers within
the AMG changed quite quickly. The first position was very close to the
one expressed by the Public Law n. 472, which privileged in the first place
the economic integration of the whole of Europe. During the second year
of the plan, the attitude shifted, embracing a sort of local adaptation,
which had as its main objective the creation of increasingly solid links
between the Trieste economy and the Italian one.10 In practice, starting
from its second year, the Trieste ERP became an unofficial extension of
the Italian ERP.11
9 NARA, RG, 331, File 75, Allied Secretariat Planning papers, AMG-BUSZ/FTT, Har-
aldson, Establishment of new enterprises in Trieste (copy at IRSML, b. 76).
10 ‘It is unfortunate that the Italian Govt has found it necessary to adopt a political
approach in dealing with matters which should be considered in economic terms if
ERP is to be a success. […] AMG’s approach has been (and will continue to be) in the
direction of the complete integration of this territory into a unified Western Euro-
pean economy. This may ultimately occur directly or via the Italian economy. In ei-
ther case the final objective is the same and the course of action we have outlined
is the only one which makes economic sense to us.’ NARA, RG 469, entry 1394,
box 10, fasc. Programs – Trieste 1948/49, Ivan B. White [Director Finance and Eco-
nomic Department, GMA-Trieste] to Secstate, Washington, 5 May 1948, ‘secret’.
11 ‘I have been mindful of your concern that AMG’s recovery planning and program-
ming be closely coordinated with that of the Italian Government, with a view to
making the eventual transfer of this area to Italy as smooth a transition as possi-
ble.’ NARA, RG 469, entry 1394, box 10, fasc. Programs – Trieste 1948/49, White to
‘Members of the Council’, Trieste’s 1949–50 Investment Program, 15 August 1949.
116
a stable positionality for the Trieste economic system inside the Western
area, while, on the other hand, both the Italian government and the lo-
cal Italian officials acted to subdue the local economy to certain Italian
needs, especially in the maritime sector. At the end, the ERP-Trieste pro-
ject was one of the most financed in Europe (on a per capita basis) but it
was quite completely fruitless in creating a self-sustained economy.
On the one hand, the Italian Government did not hesitate to hinder
or reject any initiative that did not fit into a national development plan
and had exclusively local values, to the detriment of the country’s inter-
est. On the other hand, it did not hesitate to support strong national and
local interests – such as public enterprises (Ilva, shipbuilding and ship-
ping firms), or monopoly groups (Italcementi) - to the detriment of small
and medium-sized industries:9 precisely the accusation that the Italian
government and the ECA mission in Rome levied against the AMG (Serra
1954).
After the plan started, the attitude of the American officers within
the AMG changed quite quickly. The first position was very close to the
one expressed by the Public Law n. 472, which privileged in the first place
the economic integration of the whole of Europe. During the second year
of the plan, the attitude shifted, embracing a sort of local adaptation,
which had as its main objective the creation of increasingly solid links
between the Trieste economy and the Italian one.10 In practice, starting
from its second year, the Trieste ERP became an unofficial extension of
the Italian ERP.11
9 NARA, RG, 331, File 75, Allied Secretariat Planning papers, AMG-BUSZ/FTT, Har-
aldson, Establishment of new enterprises in Trieste (copy at IRSML, b. 76).
10 ‘It is unfortunate that the Italian Govt has found it necessary to adopt a political
approach in dealing with matters which should be considered in economic terms if
ERP is to be a success. […] AMG’s approach has been (and will continue to be) in the
direction of the complete integration of this territory into a unified Western Euro-
pean economy. This may ultimately occur directly or via the Italian economy. In ei-
ther case the final objective is the same and the course of action we have outlined
is the only one which makes economic sense to us.’ NARA, RG 469, entry 1394,
box 10, fasc. Programs – Trieste 1948/49, Ivan B. White [Director Finance and Eco-
nomic Department, GMA-Trieste] to Secstate, Washington, 5 May 1948, ‘secret’.
11 ‘I have been mindful of your concern that AMG’s recovery planning and program-
ming be closely coordinated with that of the Italian Government, with a view to
making the eventual transfer of this area to Italy as smooth a transition as possi-
ble.’ NARA, RG 469, entry 1394, box 10, fasc. Programs – Trieste 1948/49, White to
‘Members of the Council’, Trieste’s 1949–50 Investment Program, 15 August 1949.
116
