Page 159 - Mellinato, Giulio, and Aleksander Panjek. Eds. 2022. Complex Gateways. Labour and Urban History of Maritime Port Cities: The Northern Adriaticin a Comparative Perspective. Koper: University of Primorska Press.
P. 159
Workers of the Port of Koper and the Economic Reform Period in 1960s Slovenia
or ‘mighty’ directors were known as authoritarians (Prinčič 2008a, 104–
8). Formally, workers’ self-management in the 1965–1970 period meant
that on the level of the company, the director was no longer an employ-
ee of the state, accountable directly to the republic/communal authori-
ties. He was now beholden to the elected workers’ council (which also offi-
cially appointed him to this position on the basis of a tender commission
consisting of workers’ representatives and local community/republic del-
egates), and was supposed to manage the company in line with its direc-
tives (Prinčič 2008b, 66–7). Each company also had an LCS organization.
Theoretically speaking, the director was little more than first among
equals at the company, but the reality of mighty managers like Petrinja
was drastically different. They were bosses in the most imposing sense of
the word. Petrinja won this status predominately through his deep com-
mitment to the construction of the Port of Koper. The actual views of the
highest authorities in Slovenia and Yugoslavia regarding port construc-
tion in Koper are still the subject of debate. Terčon is probably right in ar-
guing that even though many testimonies and documents suggest that
top politicians did not support the project, that was not really the case.
Silent support existed in Slovenia; had it been otherwise, Petrinja’s ef-
forts would have been in vain (Terčon 2015, 294, 314). The fact remains
that unlike other ports in Yugoslavia (and as Bruno Korelič, Petrinja’s
successor, outlined, literally anywhere else), the Port of Koper was not
built by the federal state or republic, i.e. through investment funds (the
latter represented only a tiny share of total funding), but largely with
loans. For the purpose of this article, this crucial fact is seen as having
negative consequences for workers’ wages and living standards in gener-
al (Petrinja 1997, 74; Terčon 2015, 296). Obtaining loans, looking for in-
vestors and partners, required lobbying top politicians and Party func-
tionaries, but also bullying and dangerous confrontations. Petrinja’s
published account of the construction of the Port of Koper gives the read-
er the impression that it required trials and strain worthy of Marvel he-
roes. In his career as Port director, Petrinja was brought before the courts
four times and investigated by the Party commission five times, although
he did get off the hook each time (Petrinja 1999, 10). In Belgrade in 1961,
Petrinja unsuccessfully tried to persuade the federal secretary (minister)
for transport, representatives of the Yugoslav railways and the Port of
Rijeka, and the Croatian secretary for transport to bring tariffs for cargo
transport from Koper to Kozina up to the same levels enjoyed by the Port
159
or ‘mighty’ directors were known as authoritarians (Prinčič 2008a, 104–
8). Formally, workers’ self-management in the 1965–1970 period meant
that on the level of the company, the director was no longer an employ-
ee of the state, accountable directly to the republic/communal authori-
ties. He was now beholden to the elected workers’ council (which also offi-
cially appointed him to this position on the basis of a tender commission
consisting of workers’ representatives and local community/republic del-
egates), and was supposed to manage the company in line with its direc-
tives (Prinčič 2008b, 66–7). Each company also had an LCS organization.
Theoretically speaking, the director was little more than first among
equals at the company, but the reality of mighty managers like Petrinja
was drastically different. They were bosses in the most imposing sense of
the word. Petrinja won this status predominately through his deep com-
mitment to the construction of the Port of Koper. The actual views of the
highest authorities in Slovenia and Yugoslavia regarding port construc-
tion in Koper are still the subject of debate. Terčon is probably right in ar-
guing that even though many testimonies and documents suggest that
top politicians did not support the project, that was not really the case.
Silent support existed in Slovenia; had it been otherwise, Petrinja’s ef-
forts would have been in vain (Terčon 2015, 294, 314). The fact remains
that unlike other ports in Yugoslavia (and as Bruno Korelič, Petrinja’s
successor, outlined, literally anywhere else), the Port of Koper was not
built by the federal state or republic, i.e. through investment funds (the
latter represented only a tiny share of total funding), but largely with
loans. For the purpose of this article, this crucial fact is seen as having
negative consequences for workers’ wages and living standards in gener-
al (Petrinja 1997, 74; Terčon 2015, 296). Obtaining loans, looking for in-
vestors and partners, required lobbying top politicians and Party func-
tionaries, but also bullying and dangerous confrontations. Petrinja’s
published account of the construction of the Port of Koper gives the read-
er the impression that it required trials and strain worthy of Marvel he-
roes. In his career as Port director, Petrinja was brought before the courts
four times and investigated by the Party commission five times, although
he did get off the hook each time (Petrinja 1999, 10). In Belgrade in 1961,
Petrinja unsuccessfully tried to persuade the federal secretary (minister)
for transport, representatives of the Yugoslav railways and the Port of
Rijeka, and the Croatian secretary for transport to bring tariffs for cargo
transport from Koper to Kozina up to the same levels enjoyed by the Port
159
