Page 164 - Mellinato, Giulio, and Aleksander Panjek. Eds. 2022. Complex Gateways. Labour and Urban History of Maritime Port Cities: The Northern Adriaticin a Comparative Perspective. Koper: University of Primorska Press.
P. 164
plex Gateways
panies were nominally run by the workers themselves, while manage-
ment performed executive tasks on their behalf. A strike was absurd for,
in theory, the workers were striking against themselves.
But why did this “anomaly” occur at the Port of Koper? As Rutar sug-
gests, the conflicts in the port’s management most probably played an
important part in the strike. But without poor living and working condi-
tions and problems with workers’ wages, the management could not take
the advantage and manipulate the event in the first place. Besides, the
Party was very good in settling brawls between bureaucrats and the man-
agerial elite in its own ranks. However, settling class conflicts proved to
be a much more difficult task. The Party’s claim of its leading role in so-
ciety was based on the promise to direct the project of modernization in
line with the interests of the working class. Workers’ dissatisfactions put
the Party to the test. As explained by Rutar, that was the reason why the
authorities in Yugoslavia at that time dealt quickly with the workers’ de-
mands, largely by satisfying them. Even though strike organizers were
often targeted, more often than not, managers were those to be accused
(Rutar 2015, 286).
Diverging from Petrinja’s much later account, the Party claimed, in
general terms, that the ‘unsettled and insufficiently stable system of in-
come distribution and insufficient involvement of workers in self-manag-
ing decision making, of necessity maintained the wage mentality which
was clearly manifested in the work stoppage.’ This assessment was also
published in Delo (Guzej 1970b, 2). For the Party, the situation at the com-
pany was severe. So severe, in fact, that Stane Kavčič, ‘the liberal’, report-
edly demanded that the Port workers immediately receive a raise, even
if it put the company in the red (Petrinja 1993, 216). In 1970, the Port of
Koper had 1,200 employees; in the previous year, 500 workers left the
company to find better jobs elsewhere. Many specialists quit their jobs
as well (6 specialists with a higher education over the previous two years:
warehouse managers, shift foremen, etc.) These figures more or less match
Petrinja’s latter day account: 490 left the Port in 1969, and 703 were newly
hired (Petrinja 1993, 212). The Party recognized that the port was paying
the price for economic reform. As suggested above, federal funds were no
longer available to finance its investments, while commercial banks of-
fered credits on unfavourable terms. To make matters worse, the Port of
Koper was the main investor in the railway from Koper to Prešnica.
164
panies were nominally run by the workers themselves, while manage-
ment performed executive tasks on their behalf. A strike was absurd for,
in theory, the workers were striking against themselves.
But why did this “anomaly” occur at the Port of Koper? As Rutar sug-
gests, the conflicts in the port’s management most probably played an
important part in the strike. But without poor living and working condi-
tions and problems with workers’ wages, the management could not take
the advantage and manipulate the event in the first place. Besides, the
Party was very good in settling brawls between bureaucrats and the man-
agerial elite in its own ranks. However, settling class conflicts proved to
be a much more difficult task. The Party’s claim of its leading role in so-
ciety was based on the promise to direct the project of modernization in
line with the interests of the working class. Workers’ dissatisfactions put
the Party to the test. As explained by Rutar, that was the reason why the
authorities in Yugoslavia at that time dealt quickly with the workers’ de-
mands, largely by satisfying them. Even though strike organizers were
often targeted, more often than not, managers were those to be accused
(Rutar 2015, 286).
Diverging from Petrinja’s much later account, the Party claimed, in
general terms, that the ‘unsettled and insufficiently stable system of in-
come distribution and insufficient involvement of workers in self-manag-
ing decision making, of necessity maintained the wage mentality which
was clearly manifested in the work stoppage.’ This assessment was also
published in Delo (Guzej 1970b, 2). For the Party, the situation at the com-
pany was severe. So severe, in fact, that Stane Kavčič, ‘the liberal’, report-
edly demanded that the Port workers immediately receive a raise, even
if it put the company in the red (Petrinja 1993, 216). In 1970, the Port of
Koper had 1,200 employees; in the previous year, 500 workers left the
company to find better jobs elsewhere. Many specialists quit their jobs
as well (6 specialists with a higher education over the previous two years:
warehouse managers, shift foremen, etc.) These figures more or less match
Petrinja’s latter day account: 490 left the Port in 1969, and 703 were newly
hired (Petrinja 1993, 212). The Party recognized that the port was paying
the price for economic reform. As suggested above, federal funds were no
longer available to finance its investments, while commercial banks of-
fered credits on unfavourable terms. To make matters worse, the Port of
Koper was the main investor in the railway from Koper to Prešnica.
164
