Page 46 - Mellinato, Giulio, and Aleksander Panjek. Eds. 2022. Complex Gateways. Labour and Urban History of Maritime Port Cities: The Northern Adriaticin a Comparative Perspective. Koper: University of Primorska Press.
P. 46
plex Gateways
importance of this fuel handled in the port of Genoa. For the same rea-
son, in the period in question, the number of its registered members re-
corded the highest growth: from 130 in 1797 to 370 in 1815. It should also
be pointed out that, even if the guilds were progressively abolished in
the 1830s following a liberalization drive of port activities, in 1851 there
were still 396 regularly registered porters with the Coal Porters Guild,
who were still working under a monopoly regime (Piccinno 2000, 310–17).
A rigid system controlled by guilds: with what consequences?
While, on the one hand, the guild system ensured a high degree of profes-
sionalism and offered an effective way to control its members’ activities,
on the other hand, as a closed system, it was not flexible in terms of job
supply. This would often clash with the fluctuating demand for some port
services – from pilotage to transport by barge or manually of both in-
coming or outgoing cargoes – which was dependent on external variables
beyond any control, such as, for example, traffic trends, in turn linked
to natural events like plague and famine, or political events like wars,
etc. In this regard, the Boatmen Guild is a good case in point: for a long
time, it would agree to unregistered workers being allowed to work the
trade with impunity, in order to meet the needs of the port in periods of
strong traffic growth, provided the number of registered workers did not
increase (ASCG, PC, 627, 21 October 1730). This unusual approach could be
explained by the many privileges enjoyed by guild members: dowries for
the masters’ daughters, social security systems for sick members or mem-
bers with economic difficulties, and financial aid for widows and orphans.
Therefore, in order to face changing market needs, they were ready to ac-
cept even clear limitations to their monopoly conditions, provided they
could avoid admitting new members.
Differences between the various guilds working in the port are an-
other important feature, both in terms of their more or less remote ori-
gins and, as seen above, in the number of registered members and their
level of specialization. The result was a system that was quite difficult for
city authorities to manage, especially at times of employment slumps fol-
lowing decreases in traffic. The registered members of the oldest guilds
were generally better skilled, with incomes enabling them to enjoy high-
er living standards. Controls by the authorities of these guilds were rela-
tively limited and mainly aimed at protecting government tax interests.
46
importance of this fuel handled in the port of Genoa. For the same rea-
son, in the period in question, the number of its registered members re-
corded the highest growth: from 130 in 1797 to 370 in 1815. It should also
be pointed out that, even if the guilds were progressively abolished in
the 1830s following a liberalization drive of port activities, in 1851 there
were still 396 regularly registered porters with the Coal Porters Guild,
who were still working under a monopoly regime (Piccinno 2000, 310–17).
A rigid system controlled by guilds: with what consequences?
While, on the one hand, the guild system ensured a high degree of profes-
sionalism and offered an effective way to control its members’ activities,
on the other hand, as a closed system, it was not flexible in terms of job
supply. This would often clash with the fluctuating demand for some port
services – from pilotage to transport by barge or manually of both in-
coming or outgoing cargoes – which was dependent on external variables
beyond any control, such as, for example, traffic trends, in turn linked
to natural events like plague and famine, or political events like wars,
etc. In this regard, the Boatmen Guild is a good case in point: for a long
time, it would agree to unregistered workers being allowed to work the
trade with impunity, in order to meet the needs of the port in periods of
strong traffic growth, provided the number of registered workers did not
increase (ASCG, PC, 627, 21 October 1730). This unusual approach could be
explained by the many privileges enjoyed by guild members: dowries for
the masters’ daughters, social security systems for sick members or mem-
bers with economic difficulties, and financial aid for widows and orphans.
Therefore, in order to face changing market needs, they were ready to ac-
cept even clear limitations to their monopoly conditions, provided they
could avoid admitting new members.
Differences between the various guilds working in the port are an-
other important feature, both in terms of their more or less remote ori-
gins and, as seen above, in the number of registered members and their
level of specialization. The result was a system that was quite difficult for
city authorities to manage, especially at times of employment slumps fol-
lowing decreases in traffic. The registered members of the oldest guilds
were generally better skilled, with incomes enabling them to enjoy high-
er living standards. Controls by the authorities of these guilds were rela-
tively limited and mainly aimed at protecting government tax interests.
46
