Page 64 - Mellinato, Giulio, and Aleksander Panjek. Eds. 2022. Complex Gateways. Labour and Urban History of Maritime Port Cities: The Northern Adriaticin a Comparative Perspective. Koper: University of Primorska Press.
P. 64
plex Gateways
the employment opportunities, in a way so as not to increase the num-
ber of poor people during the idle seasons for port traffic. The initial reg-
ulatory plan introduced two separate matrices, one for company and pri-
vate employees, the other for porters offering themselves freely on the
market. For the latter, the reform envisioned the distribution by the dif-
ferent companies and the appointment of foremen to deploy workers as
needed by the clients. Payment was assessed on the basis of the weight of
the goods carried, the distance, and the method for the delivery, as in the
cases of manual transshipment. The chiefs were personally responsible
for every inadequate performance of the work done by each subordinate
member of the group. Porters and those who wished to join them had
to be registered with the stock exchange deputation and entered them-
selves in the register, so the workers’ register could be properly compiled
and maintained. Without this prior procedure and admission to the reg-
ister, no one would be allowed to offer porter services. The guards were
tasked with controlling the species of porter and punishing every viola-
tor of the rules.11
However, despite the compilation of the register, everything re-
mained the same, because everything got stuck when it came time to
set the official price for the services. According to wholesalers, the tar-
iffs for porter labour were in conflict with the principle of a free econo-
my, and thus with free port legislation (BCT, AD, AP, Giornali di Polizia, 9
May 1774). The need to regulate porter work re-emerged in the mid-1770s,
with population growth and increasing breaches of public order which,
according to police experience, stemmed mainly from uncontrolled ac-
cess to the porter labour market. However, trade operators again did not
tolerate any interference, not only because of the issue of tariffs but also
over the concern that the port would be left without a sufficient number
of workers. The renewed plan, drawn up by Police Director Pittoni, there-
fore provided that the temporary workers from Friuli and Istria (foreign-
ers from the Venetian republic) were allowed to provisionally enter the
porter labour market during favourable seasons. Permanently resident
porters certainly retained an advantage, especially those who negotiat-
ed lower prices for services, which the chiefs were obliged to take care of
when deploying workers. Merchants retained full freedom in hiring pri-
11 BCT, AD, AP, 30 August 1768; Giornali di Polizia, 20 January 1769; Giornali di
Polizia, 18 April 1769.
64
the employment opportunities, in a way so as not to increase the num-
ber of poor people during the idle seasons for port traffic. The initial reg-
ulatory plan introduced two separate matrices, one for company and pri-
vate employees, the other for porters offering themselves freely on the
market. For the latter, the reform envisioned the distribution by the dif-
ferent companies and the appointment of foremen to deploy workers as
needed by the clients. Payment was assessed on the basis of the weight of
the goods carried, the distance, and the method for the delivery, as in the
cases of manual transshipment. The chiefs were personally responsible
for every inadequate performance of the work done by each subordinate
member of the group. Porters and those who wished to join them had
to be registered with the stock exchange deputation and entered them-
selves in the register, so the workers’ register could be properly compiled
and maintained. Without this prior procedure and admission to the reg-
ister, no one would be allowed to offer porter services. The guards were
tasked with controlling the species of porter and punishing every viola-
tor of the rules.11
However, despite the compilation of the register, everything re-
mained the same, because everything got stuck when it came time to
set the official price for the services. According to wholesalers, the tar-
iffs for porter labour were in conflict with the principle of a free econo-
my, and thus with free port legislation (BCT, AD, AP, Giornali di Polizia, 9
May 1774). The need to regulate porter work re-emerged in the mid-1770s,
with population growth and increasing breaches of public order which,
according to police experience, stemmed mainly from uncontrolled ac-
cess to the porter labour market. However, trade operators again did not
tolerate any interference, not only because of the issue of tariffs but also
over the concern that the port would be left without a sufficient number
of workers. The renewed plan, drawn up by Police Director Pittoni, there-
fore provided that the temporary workers from Friuli and Istria (foreign-
ers from the Venetian republic) were allowed to provisionally enter the
porter labour market during favourable seasons. Permanently resident
porters certainly retained an advantage, especially those who negotiat-
ed lower prices for services, which the chiefs were obliged to take care of
when deploying workers. Merchants retained full freedom in hiring pri-
11 BCT, AD, AP, 30 August 1768; Giornali di Polizia, 20 January 1769; Giornali di
Polizia, 18 April 1769.
64
