Page 301 - Lazar, Irena, Aleksander Panjek in Jonatan Vinkler. Ur. 2020. Mikro in makro. Pristopi in prispevki k humanističnim vedam ob dvajsetletnici UP Fakultete za humanistične študije, 2. knjiga. Koper: Založba Univerze na Primorskem.
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reasoning and representation in “visual argumentation”

In analysing the poster, the authors (Birdsell and Groarke) first ad-
mit that “visual images can, of course, be vague and ambiguous. But this
alone does not distinguish them from words and sentences, which can
also be vague and ambiguous”. And we can agree with that. Then they
qualify this poster as “an amalgam of the verbal and the visual”, whi-
ch, again, sounds quite acceptable. But then they unexpectedly conclude:
“Here the argument that you should be wary of cigarettes because they
can hook you and endanger your health is forwarded by means of visu-
al images” (Birdsell and Groarke 1996, 2–3). Which is obviously not the
case. Without the verbal part, “don’t you get hooked!”, the poster could
be understood (framed) as a joke, as a cartoon, where, for example, smo-
king is presented as such a ubiquitous activity that even anglers use ciga-
rettes to catch fish. Only when we add the verbal part “don’t you get hoo-
ked!” - where “hooked” activates an associative chain or semantic frame
of knowledge relating to this specific concept, which includes “get addi-
cted”, and is, at the same time, juxtaposed with a visual representation of
a hook with a cigarette on it - is the appropriate (intended) frame4 set: the
poster is now, and only now, understood as an anti-smoking add, belon-
ging to an anti-smoking campaign.

Every argument is, of course, open to criticism and counter-argu-
ments. I wanted to empirically (and experimentally) test both lines of re-
asoning and argumentation - Groarke and Birdsell’s argument(ation) and
my counter-argument(ation) -, therefore I designed a pilot questionnaire,
titled “A Short Questionnaire on Understanding the Visuals (Drawings,

4 The concept of frames, I am using here, are frames that help us organize our every-
day experience, frames as developed by sociologist Erving Goffman in his influential
book Frame Analysis (1974). What are Goffman’s frames? In his own words: “When
the individual in our Western society recognizes a particular event, he tends, what-
ever else he does, to imply in this response (and in effect employ) one or more frame-
works or schemata of interpretation of a kind that can be called primary. I say prima-
ry because application of such a framework or perspective is seen by those who apply
it as not depending on or harking back to some prior or “original” interpretation; in-
deed a primary framework is one that is seen as rendering what would otherwise be
a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful.” Goffman dis-
tinguishes between natural and social frameworks. Natural frameworks “identify
occurrences seen as undirected, unoriented, unanimated, unguided, purely physi-
cal”. Social frameworks, on the other hand, “provide background understanding for
events that incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort of an intelligence. [...]
Motive and intent are involved, and their imputation helps select which of the var-
ious social frameworks of understandings is to be applied” (Goffman 1974, 21–22,
24).

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