Page 123 - Mellinato, Giulio, and Aleksander Panjek. Eds. 2022. Complex Gateways. Labour and Urban History of Maritime Port Cities: The Northern Adriaticin a Comparative Perspective. Koper: University of Primorska Press.
P. 123
Trieste 1948–1952: A Contended Port City and the Marshall Plan
adequate to the needs of the immediate future, needs that were already
emerging at that time.
In those years, the destiny designed for the port was a wholly inter-
national one, in sharp contrast with the political destiny of the city and
its territory. We can say, so many years later, that it was the right place,
but the wrong time.
Furthermore, noteworthy is the fact that the direct ERP aid pro-
gramme in Trieste ceased early, in 1951. From that moment on, the sup-
port to the Trieste economy was directly mediated by Rome: the ECA mis-
sion in Rome absorbed all the remaining Marshall Plan-related activities
in Trieste, and the ERP mission in Trieste was closed. This was the result
of strong disagreements between the AMG and the Italian government
regarding the most appropriate economic policies to follow in relation
to the FTT, but also (and perhaps above all) between the AMG and the
head of the ECA mission in Trieste, Galloway – the only one strongly sup-
porting a pure economic view inside the application of the ERP aid pro-
gramme. In other words, the official position was to consider the Trieste
situation as exceptional as the one adopted in Berlin, or in Greece and
Turkey.
At that time, the figures could give the impression of a successful re-
covery. Starting from 1949 the weight of the goods loaded and unload-
ed in the port of Trieste was permanently higher than the previous max-
imum of 1913. But these were very different goods. In 1951 ‘poor’ goods
such as cereals, coal, oil, and timber contributed a total of 63.1% of port
traffic, while in 1913 their share was only 40.9%, clearly indicating how
at the time the trade was made up of a greater share of ‘richer’ goods,
the transport of which made more money, and whose handling and trade
left the city with greater wealth. Furthermore, starting from the 1950s, a
large part of the overall growth of the port movement was linked to the
increase in the traffic of oil products: almost 40% of the unloaded goods in
1955, stably over 50% since 1962 (Mellinato, Scrignar, and Staccioli 2004).
What can be learned?
When the end of Marshall aid in Trieste was approaching, the United States
representative to the GMA briefly explained to the State Department the
profound meaning of what had been done in Trieste during the previous
years, and what would have to be done while the experience of the allied
administration lasted.
123
adequate to the needs of the immediate future, needs that were already
emerging at that time.
In those years, the destiny designed for the port was a wholly inter-
national one, in sharp contrast with the political destiny of the city and
its territory. We can say, so many years later, that it was the right place,
but the wrong time.
Furthermore, noteworthy is the fact that the direct ERP aid pro-
gramme in Trieste ceased early, in 1951. From that moment on, the sup-
port to the Trieste economy was directly mediated by Rome: the ECA mis-
sion in Rome absorbed all the remaining Marshall Plan-related activities
in Trieste, and the ERP mission in Trieste was closed. This was the result
of strong disagreements between the AMG and the Italian government
regarding the most appropriate economic policies to follow in relation
to the FTT, but also (and perhaps above all) between the AMG and the
head of the ECA mission in Trieste, Galloway – the only one strongly sup-
porting a pure economic view inside the application of the ERP aid pro-
gramme. In other words, the official position was to consider the Trieste
situation as exceptional as the one adopted in Berlin, or in Greece and
Turkey.
At that time, the figures could give the impression of a successful re-
covery. Starting from 1949 the weight of the goods loaded and unload-
ed in the port of Trieste was permanently higher than the previous max-
imum of 1913. But these were very different goods. In 1951 ‘poor’ goods
such as cereals, coal, oil, and timber contributed a total of 63.1% of port
traffic, while in 1913 their share was only 40.9%, clearly indicating how
at the time the trade was made up of a greater share of ‘richer’ goods,
the transport of which made more money, and whose handling and trade
left the city with greater wealth. Furthermore, starting from the 1950s, a
large part of the overall growth of the port movement was linked to the
increase in the traffic of oil products: almost 40% of the unloaded goods in
1955, stably over 50% since 1962 (Mellinato, Scrignar, and Staccioli 2004).
What can be learned?
When the end of Marshall aid in Trieste was approaching, the United States
representative to the GMA briefly explained to the State Department the
profound meaning of what had been done in Trieste during the previous
years, and what would have to be done while the experience of the allied
administration lasted.
123
