Page 127 - Mellinato, Giulio, and Aleksander Panjek. Eds. 2022. Complex Gateways. Labour and Urban History of Maritime Port Cities: The Northern Adriaticin a Comparative Perspective. Koper: University of Primorska Press.
P. 127
Trieste 1948–1952: A Contended Port City and the Marshall Plan
autonomy, in the name of the ‘specialty’ of its economy, but also greater
economic assistance, interventions, and subsidies (Balestra 2001).
The episode reveals the mental architecture with which the city eco-
nomic ruling circles really planned the reconfiguration of their roles. The
State (whether the AMG or Italy, it did not matter) should have func-
tioned as a financial background for port-maritime-merchant activities,
and the added value produced by these activities would have constituted
the income for the city. Self-government (i.e. control by representatives
or trustees of those executive circles) of the general warehouses, shipping
companies, shipyards, and other bodies responsible for managing ships
and services would have constituted the best guarantee for their use be-
low cost, and therefore granting that added value flow that fed the city.
To obtain similar results, the local economic groups needed to rely
on a strong state, financially able to support the commitments associated
with maintaining an assisted and largely parasitic area (Comitato di coor-
dinamento delle medie e piccole aziende di Trieste 1954). Clearly, the lo-
cal economic leadership lacked the ability to mature a development pro-
ject suited to the needs of the Trieste commercial and maritime identity,
especially considering the context of the cold war.
In 1954, with the return of Trieste to Italy, the prospects that opened
up for the port were not easy. A threat came in the form of the increas-
ing competition from the Croatian port of Rijeka, rebuilt after being com-
pletely destroyed during the war. Moreover, since the end of the fifties,
the dangerously close Slovenian port of Capodistria-Koper also became
operative. It was built largely from scratch thanks to US funding, provid-
ed to facilitate the conclusion of the Trieste question, as a sort of com-
pensation for the final transfer of the city to Italy (Lodato 2000, 309;
Ažman Momirski 2020). Again, a plain example of how the impelling po-
litical urgencies prevailed, at the expenses of a sound long-term econom-
ic programming.
The activities carried out by the Trieste AMG also represent a sort
of verification of the development process followed by the local system
in that period, because of what happened in the previous decades. Even
more significant, in my opinion, was the failure to devise some original
solutions, or new intervention projects and mentalities, with which the
Allies futilely tried to find their solutions to Trieste’s problems. Often
these plans were carried out starting from suggestions or models emerg-
ing from the local reality, but, in particular in the economic field and in
127
autonomy, in the name of the ‘specialty’ of its economy, but also greater
economic assistance, interventions, and subsidies (Balestra 2001).
The episode reveals the mental architecture with which the city eco-
nomic ruling circles really planned the reconfiguration of their roles. The
State (whether the AMG or Italy, it did not matter) should have func-
tioned as a financial background for port-maritime-merchant activities,
and the added value produced by these activities would have constituted
the income for the city. Self-government (i.e. control by representatives
or trustees of those executive circles) of the general warehouses, shipping
companies, shipyards, and other bodies responsible for managing ships
and services would have constituted the best guarantee for their use be-
low cost, and therefore granting that added value flow that fed the city.
To obtain similar results, the local economic groups needed to rely
on a strong state, financially able to support the commitments associated
with maintaining an assisted and largely parasitic area (Comitato di coor-
dinamento delle medie e piccole aziende di Trieste 1954). Clearly, the lo-
cal economic leadership lacked the ability to mature a development pro-
ject suited to the needs of the Trieste commercial and maritime identity,
especially considering the context of the cold war.
In 1954, with the return of Trieste to Italy, the prospects that opened
up for the port were not easy. A threat came in the form of the increas-
ing competition from the Croatian port of Rijeka, rebuilt after being com-
pletely destroyed during the war. Moreover, since the end of the fifties,
the dangerously close Slovenian port of Capodistria-Koper also became
operative. It was built largely from scratch thanks to US funding, provid-
ed to facilitate the conclusion of the Trieste question, as a sort of com-
pensation for the final transfer of the city to Italy (Lodato 2000, 309;
Ažman Momirski 2020). Again, a plain example of how the impelling po-
litical urgencies prevailed, at the expenses of a sound long-term econom-
ic programming.
The activities carried out by the Trieste AMG also represent a sort
of verification of the development process followed by the local system
in that period, because of what happened in the previous decades. Even
more significant, in my opinion, was the failure to devise some original
solutions, or new intervention projects and mentalities, with which the
Allies futilely tried to find their solutions to Trieste’s problems. Often
these plans were carried out starting from suggestions or models emerg-
ing from the local reality, but, in particular in the economic field and in
127
