Page 125 - Mellinato, Giulio, and Aleksander Panjek. Eds. 2022. Complex Gateways. Labour and Urban History of Maritime Port Cities: The Northern Adriaticin a Comparative Perspective. Koper: University of Primorska Press.
P. 125
Trieste 1948–1952: A Contended Port City and the Marshall Plan
made sense before World War I. Trieste’s hinterland had been so frag-
mented politically that the port’s raison d’ être was lost (Fuchs 1974,
41).
The Marshall Plan provided the Trieste AMG with the abundance of
financial means necessary to support all the activities started, but it also
entailed abandoning the search for a self-sufficient economy: the much
sought-after stabilization ended up with a nearly complete subjection of
the local economy to state support.
In its essence, the ERP made the city economy more dependent on
Italy both directly (with financial integration) and indirectly. For exam-
ple, the reconstruction of the Trieste Lloyd fleet took place within the log-
ic of the Italian 1936 Finmare reform (the Italian state-owned and qua-
si-monopolistic shipping company), thus inextricably linking the Trieste
company’s fleet to the Italian integrated maritime transport system.
Over time, ERP aid had helped to restore the Trieste-AMG budget
by making the Italian financial intervention less and less decisive, while
Trieste had become a sort of ‘dollar factory’ for Italy, as ECA officials re-
membered. On the other hand, the true nature of the Trieste ERP (po-
litical, not economic) rose from every angle the problem was faced, and
made it increasingly incompatible with the remaining structure of the
Marshall Plan in the rest of Europe.
The relatively higher standards of living which must be maintained
there for political, social and military occupation reasons create a
set of conditions which make it impossible to consider Trieste’s needs
with the same economic criteria as are used in Italy. For obvious rea-
sons, the Occupation Authorities must be left free to establish eco-
nomic, political and social conditions which make the Occupation
as acceptable as possible, but at the same time to accomplish Anglo-
American objectives. […] The entire pattern of economic development
in Trieste has been based upon the necessity of maintaining minimum
unemployment levels and maximum social and political tranquillity,
without too much concern for the future economy of the Territory.
[…] I can only see an economic unit of another agency being effective,
if it is the economic arm of the Military Government in Trieste.18
18 NARA, RG 469, Eca, Deputy Director for Operations, Office of European Opera-
tions, Italy Division, Trieste Decimal File 1948–1953, folder: TR Ec. Activ. 1.0 1.2
1.24 (copy at IRSML, b. 76), Memorandum, M. L. Dayton to Alex B. Despit, 6 Feb-
ruary 1951.
125
made sense before World War I. Trieste’s hinterland had been so frag-
mented politically that the port’s raison d’ être was lost (Fuchs 1974,
41).
The Marshall Plan provided the Trieste AMG with the abundance of
financial means necessary to support all the activities started, but it also
entailed abandoning the search for a self-sufficient economy: the much
sought-after stabilization ended up with a nearly complete subjection of
the local economy to state support.
In its essence, the ERP made the city economy more dependent on
Italy both directly (with financial integration) and indirectly. For exam-
ple, the reconstruction of the Trieste Lloyd fleet took place within the log-
ic of the Italian 1936 Finmare reform (the Italian state-owned and qua-
si-monopolistic shipping company), thus inextricably linking the Trieste
company’s fleet to the Italian integrated maritime transport system.
Over time, ERP aid had helped to restore the Trieste-AMG budget
by making the Italian financial intervention less and less decisive, while
Trieste had become a sort of ‘dollar factory’ for Italy, as ECA officials re-
membered. On the other hand, the true nature of the Trieste ERP (po-
litical, not economic) rose from every angle the problem was faced, and
made it increasingly incompatible with the remaining structure of the
Marshall Plan in the rest of Europe.
The relatively higher standards of living which must be maintained
there for political, social and military occupation reasons create a
set of conditions which make it impossible to consider Trieste’s needs
with the same economic criteria as are used in Italy. For obvious rea-
sons, the Occupation Authorities must be left free to establish eco-
nomic, political and social conditions which make the Occupation
as acceptable as possible, but at the same time to accomplish Anglo-
American objectives. […] The entire pattern of economic development
in Trieste has been based upon the necessity of maintaining minimum
unemployment levels and maximum social and political tranquillity,
without too much concern for the future economy of the Territory.
[…] I can only see an economic unit of another agency being effective,
if it is the economic arm of the Military Government in Trieste.18
18 NARA, RG 469, Eca, Deputy Director for Operations, Office of European Opera-
tions, Italy Division, Trieste Decimal File 1948–1953, folder: TR Ec. Activ. 1.0 1.2
1.24 (copy at IRSML, b. 76), Memorandum, M. L. Dayton to Alex B. Despit, 6 Feb-
ruary 1951.
125
