Page 306 - Panjek, Aleksander, Jesper Larsson and Luca Mocarelli, eds. 2017. Integrated Peasant Economy in a Comparative Perspective: Alps, Scandinavia and Beyond. Koper: University of Primorska Press
P. 306
integr ated peasant economy in a compar ative perspective
cal government supported the village population with financial aid only for
the floods of 1803. In comparison with the flood of 1803 (Kyowa 3) with that
of 1817 (Bunka 14), it is cleared that the flooding’s in 1803 caused much more
serious damage to rice production. A total of 1,118.0a (= 100m2) of rice fields
broke away, and they became river, while 1280.7a of rice fields were flooded
with water. The damage to the rice fields caused by the flooding of 1817 was
much less significant. The total of 346.5a of broken-down fields correspond-
ed to 30% of the damage in 1803, and the 198.0a of fields filled with water
represented 54% of the 1803 damage.
It is clear that the decisive factor in governmental decisions to pro-
vide support was the damage done to the rice fields, because the floods of
1817, which could not have any governmental support, washed away 16 fish-
ing boats, which were anchored on the river, and damaged a considerable
number of water-related structures such as river shelves, Mizu-Hane (Con-
struction for Changing Stream), and river weirs, but the rice fields were not
seriously damaged. In principle, the village had to manage the damage by
itself; however, if the disaster damage exceeded the capability of the village
community, and especially if the rice fields were damaged, the government
provided support. Such cases can be traced back to 1708 (Houei 5)8. Taka-
hama received governmental relief funds in 1708 (Houei 5), 1709 (Houei 6),
and 1713 (Syotoku 3), once between 1716 (Kyoho 1) and 1737 (Genbun 2), again
in 1770 (Meiwa 7), and one last time from 1803 (Kyowa 3) to 1804 (Bunka 1).
The flood-induced disaster in Takahama, however, should be perceived
not as an abnormal occurrence, but rather as a normal event, which can be
termed a “frequent life experience” (Bankoff 2009, 265). The occurrence of
repeated events had led to the existence of a reasonable framework for re-
covering and reconstructing damaged agricultural fields and water-relat-
ed structures, not only by the village residents but also by the local and re-
gional governments.
Discussion and concluding remarks
The principles of Early Modern disaster management in Japan were fou-
nded on community-based efforts; hence, the labour force, technologies,
and financing were all assumed by individual villages. When flood dama-
ge exceeded a village’s capabilities and was likely to result in land tax los-
ses, the regional government would exceptionally support the village fi-
nancially. Otherwise, the entire labour force was basically supplied by local
8 Ueda House Archive 4-additional-1-2.
304
cal government supported the village population with financial aid only for
the floods of 1803. In comparison with the flood of 1803 (Kyowa 3) with that
of 1817 (Bunka 14), it is cleared that the flooding’s in 1803 caused much more
serious damage to rice production. A total of 1,118.0a (= 100m2) of rice fields
broke away, and they became river, while 1280.7a of rice fields were flooded
with water. The damage to the rice fields caused by the flooding of 1817 was
much less significant. The total of 346.5a of broken-down fields correspond-
ed to 30% of the damage in 1803, and the 198.0a of fields filled with water
represented 54% of the 1803 damage.
It is clear that the decisive factor in governmental decisions to pro-
vide support was the damage done to the rice fields, because the floods of
1817, which could not have any governmental support, washed away 16 fish-
ing boats, which were anchored on the river, and damaged a considerable
number of water-related structures such as river shelves, Mizu-Hane (Con-
struction for Changing Stream), and river weirs, but the rice fields were not
seriously damaged. In principle, the village had to manage the damage by
itself; however, if the disaster damage exceeded the capability of the village
community, and especially if the rice fields were damaged, the government
provided support. Such cases can be traced back to 1708 (Houei 5)8. Taka-
hama received governmental relief funds in 1708 (Houei 5), 1709 (Houei 6),
and 1713 (Syotoku 3), once between 1716 (Kyoho 1) and 1737 (Genbun 2), again
in 1770 (Meiwa 7), and one last time from 1803 (Kyowa 3) to 1804 (Bunka 1).
The flood-induced disaster in Takahama, however, should be perceived
not as an abnormal occurrence, but rather as a normal event, which can be
termed a “frequent life experience” (Bankoff 2009, 265). The occurrence of
repeated events had led to the existence of a reasonable framework for re-
covering and reconstructing damaged agricultural fields and water-relat-
ed structures, not only by the village residents but also by the local and re-
gional governments.
Discussion and concluding remarks
The principles of Early Modern disaster management in Japan were fou-
nded on community-based efforts; hence, the labour force, technologies,
and financing were all assumed by individual villages. When flood dama-
ge exceeded a village’s capabilities and was likely to result in land tax los-
ses, the regional government would exceptionally support the village fi-
nancially. Otherwise, the entire labour force was basically supplied by local
8 Ueda House Archive 4-additional-1-2.
304
