Page 100 - Dark Shades of Istria
P. 100
Trans-Border Region of Istria
potentially rebellious and unreliable region.⁸⁴ Consequently, some local
people reacted with ideas of reunification with Italy (especially members
of the Italian minority) or, at best, to declare independence and obtain a
status that would make it a ‘Luxembourg of the Adriatic’ (Cocco, 2009,
p. 158; 2010, p. 15). Italian politicians naturally had appetites to change
the borders and extend once again to the Eastern Adriatic (Janjentović,
2017, pp. 18–22). Interestingly, Serbian influential figures, e.g. Dobrica
Ćosić and Vladislav Jovanović, in the storm of political changes and in
line with Serbian plans, also allowed the possibility of a re-annexation of
Istria to Italy, as a consequence of the dissolution of the federation (Jan-
jentović, 2017, pp. 18–19; Šetić, 2011a, p. 420). At the time of major changes
in Europe (the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and Yugoslavia), a delegation
of Italian neo-fascists visited Belgrade to agree on a division of territo-
ries. This also means that the then resuscitated stories of the foibe and the
Italian exodus were upgraded with ideas of reopening the border issue
– especially among the esuli n g o s and Italian (extreme) right-wingers
(Pirjevec et al., 2012, pp. 212, 216). In any case, Istrian regionalists wanted
a stronger and Western Europe-oriented region with a high standard of
living, a borderland with the hybrid identity of Croatian, Slovenian, and
Italian elements (multicultural identity) (Ashbrook, 2005, pp. 482–483,
2006, pp. 5–6; Ballinger, 2002; Banovac et al., 2014; Baskar, 1999; Cocco,
2010; Janjentović, 2017, pp. 11–12; Medica, 1998; Raos, 2014; Šantić, 2000;
Wolff, 2006, p. 111).
Although observed, these movements of the 1990s remained in the
shadow of the conflict in other parts of the Second Yugoslavia. One of the
first steps of the y pa was the disarmament of the Slovenian and Croa-
tian Territorial Defence Forces, which began with the Decision of the
Yugoslav Presidency as early as in 1989 (Marijan, 2008, pp. 76–77). The
Croatian homeland war in Istria was not as intense as, for example, in
eastern Slavonia, in the area of Karlovac and some parts of Dalmatia. Ma-
jušević (2012, pp. 445–446) pointed out some facts related to the Istrian
police and its conflict-related activities, i.e. the confiscation of weapons of
Istrian hunters, support to desert ypa, contacts with the ypa command
in Pula, preparation for the mining of the Pula–Pazin road to prevent
arrivals of tanks from Pazin, the prevention of fuel transportation from
Slovenia to the Pula Barracks and the formation of special police units.
Croatian Istria was ‘liberated’ by the end of 1991 without a direct
⁸⁴ This linguistically mixed area has always had a sense of inferiority in relation to the more
continental and nationally more homogeneous areas (Purini, 2012, p. 424).
100
potentially rebellious and unreliable region.⁸⁴ Consequently, some local
people reacted with ideas of reunification with Italy (especially members
of the Italian minority) or, at best, to declare independence and obtain a
status that would make it a ‘Luxembourg of the Adriatic’ (Cocco, 2009,
p. 158; 2010, p. 15). Italian politicians naturally had appetites to change
the borders and extend once again to the Eastern Adriatic (Janjentović,
2017, pp. 18–22). Interestingly, Serbian influential figures, e.g. Dobrica
Ćosić and Vladislav Jovanović, in the storm of political changes and in
line with Serbian plans, also allowed the possibility of a re-annexation of
Istria to Italy, as a consequence of the dissolution of the federation (Jan-
jentović, 2017, pp. 18–19; Šetić, 2011a, p. 420). At the time of major changes
in Europe (the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and Yugoslavia), a delegation
of Italian neo-fascists visited Belgrade to agree on a division of territo-
ries. This also means that the then resuscitated stories of the foibe and the
Italian exodus were upgraded with ideas of reopening the border issue
– especially among the esuli n g o s and Italian (extreme) right-wingers
(Pirjevec et al., 2012, pp. 212, 216). In any case, Istrian regionalists wanted
a stronger and Western Europe-oriented region with a high standard of
living, a borderland with the hybrid identity of Croatian, Slovenian, and
Italian elements (multicultural identity) (Ashbrook, 2005, pp. 482–483,
2006, pp. 5–6; Ballinger, 2002; Banovac et al., 2014; Baskar, 1999; Cocco,
2010; Janjentović, 2017, pp. 11–12; Medica, 1998; Raos, 2014; Šantić, 2000;
Wolff, 2006, p. 111).
Although observed, these movements of the 1990s remained in the
shadow of the conflict in other parts of the Second Yugoslavia. One of the
first steps of the y pa was the disarmament of the Slovenian and Croa-
tian Territorial Defence Forces, which began with the Decision of the
Yugoslav Presidency as early as in 1989 (Marijan, 2008, pp. 76–77). The
Croatian homeland war in Istria was not as intense as, for example, in
eastern Slavonia, in the area of Karlovac and some parts of Dalmatia. Ma-
jušević (2012, pp. 445–446) pointed out some facts related to the Istrian
police and its conflict-related activities, i.e. the confiscation of weapons of
Istrian hunters, support to desert ypa, contacts with the ypa command
in Pula, preparation for the mining of the Pula–Pazin road to prevent
arrivals of tanks from Pazin, the prevention of fuel transportation from
Slovenia to the Pula Barracks and the formation of special police units.
Croatian Istria was ‘liberated’ by the end of 1991 without a direct
⁸⁴ This linguistically mixed area has always had a sense of inferiority in relation to the more
continental and nationally more homogeneous areas (Purini, 2012, p. 424).
100
