Page 99 - Dark Shades of Istria
P. 99
5.3 Region of Istria: A Brief Historical Overview
lation and the protection of the rights of minorities helped the gradual
development of tolerance and coexistence among the peoples and cul-
tures of Istria. The region became less dependent on the governments in
Ljubljana and Zagreb, which promoted the desire for greater autonomy⁸¹
– this was and still is less meaningful in the homeland-war-affected coun-
ties dependent on constant state financial interventions. However, Istria
faced an imbalanced development of major coastal towns and the rural
interior of the peninsula, which resulted in the economic stagnation and
depopulation of central Istria.
The end of the Cold War and the democratisation of the two most de-
veloped Yugoslav republics in the late 1980s and early 1990s caused ex-
tensive political changes, which were especially evident after the decla-
ration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991. Election
results in 1990 in both countries showed the victory of the new right-
wing parties, while, on the other hand, the parties of the left-wing po-
litical bloc celebrated in Istria (Klemenčić, 1991, p. 103; Pesek, 2007, pp.
141, 153–159). Some political mistakes of the central political authorities
(parties) led to the enforcement of strong regional parties,⁸² which were
and still are more receptive to multiculturalism, specific economic devel-
opment and cross-border integration in the Upper Adriatic. This was/is
otherwise consistent with the liberal-social-democratic ideological ori-
entation of the residents of Istria (Šantić, 2000).⁸³
after the slovenian and croatian declaration
of independence
In the years following 1991, the political and cultural elite of Croatia
and Slovenia commenced the marginalisation and isolation of Istria as a
⁸¹ The so-called ‘balkanisation,’ as defined by Bugajski (Cocco, 2010, p. 22), means ‘the de-
generation of mutual trust between a majority and minority group, which would even-
tually turn calls for cultural protection and local self-government into secession move-
ments,’ and does not as much reflect interregional relations today as it does the attitude
towards Ljubljana and Zagreb; see also Banovac et al. (2014).
⁸² In Croatia, Istarski demokratski sabor – Dieta democratica Istriana (i d s-ddi), or Koper
je naš and Izola je naša in Slovenia. Relations (including political mistakes of the central
political authorities) to the central political parties are identified in Cocco (2010) and
Banovac et al. (2014).
⁸³ More can be found on the official website of the Istrian County (Istarska županija, n.d.),
Baloban et al. (2019, p. 44); see also the election results of Državna volilna komisija
(Državna volilna komisija, 2018).
99
lation and the protection of the rights of minorities helped the gradual
development of tolerance and coexistence among the peoples and cul-
tures of Istria. The region became less dependent on the governments in
Ljubljana and Zagreb, which promoted the desire for greater autonomy⁸¹
– this was and still is less meaningful in the homeland-war-affected coun-
ties dependent on constant state financial interventions. However, Istria
faced an imbalanced development of major coastal towns and the rural
interior of the peninsula, which resulted in the economic stagnation and
depopulation of central Istria.
The end of the Cold War and the democratisation of the two most de-
veloped Yugoslav republics in the late 1980s and early 1990s caused ex-
tensive political changes, which were especially evident after the decla-
ration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991. Election
results in 1990 in both countries showed the victory of the new right-
wing parties, while, on the other hand, the parties of the left-wing po-
litical bloc celebrated in Istria (Klemenčić, 1991, p. 103; Pesek, 2007, pp.
141, 153–159). Some political mistakes of the central political authorities
(parties) led to the enforcement of strong regional parties,⁸² which were
and still are more receptive to multiculturalism, specific economic devel-
opment and cross-border integration in the Upper Adriatic. This was/is
otherwise consistent with the liberal-social-democratic ideological ori-
entation of the residents of Istria (Šantić, 2000).⁸³
after the slovenian and croatian declaration
of independence
In the years following 1991, the political and cultural elite of Croatia
and Slovenia commenced the marginalisation and isolation of Istria as a
⁸¹ The so-called ‘balkanisation,’ as defined by Bugajski (Cocco, 2010, p. 22), means ‘the de-
generation of mutual trust between a majority and minority group, which would even-
tually turn calls for cultural protection and local self-government into secession move-
ments,’ and does not as much reflect interregional relations today as it does the attitude
towards Ljubljana and Zagreb; see also Banovac et al. (2014).
⁸² In Croatia, Istarski demokratski sabor – Dieta democratica Istriana (i d s-ddi), or Koper
je naš and Izola je naša in Slovenia. Relations (including political mistakes of the central
political authorities) to the central political parties are identified in Cocco (2010) and
Banovac et al. (2014).
⁸³ More can be found on the official website of the Istrian County (Istarska županija, n.d.),
Baloban et al. (2019, p. 44); see also the election results of Državna volilna komisija
(Državna volilna komisija, 2018).
99
