Page 95 - Dark Shades of Istria
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5.3 Region of Istria: A Brief Historical Overview
tism/centres of Italian identity (Kosmač, 2017; Sluga, 1999, p. 179). Execu-
tions of Italians (fascists and their followers, capitalists and possessors) by
Tito’s army (Altin & Badurina, 2017; D’Alessio, 2012a; Radošević, 2010),⁷¹
caused additional disturbance. In addition to two Catholic priests who
were executed by the new Yugoslav forces – Francesco Bonifacio (1946)
and Miroslav Bulešić (1947) (Oblak Moscarda, 2016, pp. 162–163; Porečka
i Pulska biskupija, 2018a; Trogrlić, 2008, p. 133) – many anti-communists
and more democratically-oriented communists were also tortured and
imprisoned (Oblak Moscarda, 2016). In the post-war period, as well as
in subsequent years, the foibe issue became the subject of extensive Ital-
ian uncritical and one-sided (manipulative) political propaganda (Accati,
2009, pp. 185–187; Pirjevec et al., 2012; Scotti, 2008; Verginella, 2009a).⁷²
Hence, the unfriendly attitude toward believers and Catholic clerics was
also evident, and the church was more and more marginalised (Grah,
2009, pp. 11–24; Trogrlić, 2014; Veraja, 2013, pp. 34–42).
Major disagreements in Istria between Italy and Yugoslavia in deter-
mining the state border were evident, and intelligence services and pro-
paganda played an especially important role (Kosmač, 2017). With the
Paris Peace Treaties signed in 1947, Italy had to cede the entire eastern
Adriatic and most of Istria to Yugoslavia. The rest of the Istrian province
(north of the River Mirna), as well as the province of Trieste, became a
special sovereign State – the Free Territory of Trieste – under a provisional
regime of the Government (Bufon, 2008c; 2009b; Dukovski, 2010; Kos-
mač, 2017; Rogoznica, 2011; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of Amer-
⁷¹ D’Alessio (2012a) claims that this topic is abused and inflated. The number of civilian
victims in the Upper Adriatic was lower than in other areas where Tito’s army operated.
The problem of heterogeneity of empirical data in relation to the number of emigrants is
also highlighted by Hrobat Virloget (2015) and Šarić (2015).
⁷² Until the 1990s, the principle of silence prevailed in ‘Yugoslav Istria,’ but it was not com-
pletely different in Italy either, at least officially. In fact, serious discussions began after
the democratisation and collapse of the Second Yugoslavia. The Italian political propa-
ganda, political discussions, and litigations, as well as artistic creation (especially since
the 1990s) is marked as a ‘culture of foibe’ by Pirjevec et al. (2012, pp. 234–241). The final
report of the Slovene-Italian Historical and Cultural Commission – see Kacin-Wohinz
(2001) – which linked the issue of the foibe to irredentism, fascism, war, nationalisms
and communism, did not help stabilise the situation. However, less mythologisation is
observed on the Slovenian and Croatian sides. Nevertheless, the already mentioned ter-
minological differences related to fatalities as a reason for different interpretations – see
Burigo (2005, p. 316) – should not be neglected.
95
tism/centres of Italian identity (Kosmač, 2017; Sluga, 1999, p. 179). Execu-
tions of Italians (fascists and their followers, capitalists and possessors) by
Tito’s army (Altin & Badurina, 2017; D’Alessio, 2012a; Radošević, 2010),⁷¹
caused additional disturbance. In addition to two Catholic priests who
were executed by the new Yugoslav forces – Francesco Bonifacio (1946)
and Miroslav Bulešić (1947) (Oblak Moscarda, 2016, pp. 162–163; Porečka
i Pulska biskupija, 2018a; Trogrlić, 2008, p. 133) – many anti-communists
and more democratically-oriented communists were also tortured and
imprisoned (Oblak Moscarda, 2016). In the post-war period, as well as
in subsequent years, the foibe issue became the subject of extensive Ital-
ian uncritical and one-sided (manipulative) political propaganda (Accati,
2009, pp. 185–187; Pirjevec et al., 2012; Scotti, 2008; Verginella, 2009a).⁷²
Hence, the unfriendly attitude toward believers and Catholic clerics was
also evident, and the church was more and more marginalised (Grah,
2009, pp. 11–24; Trogrlić, 2014; Veraja, 2013, pp. 34–42).
Major disagreements in Istria between Italy and Yugoslavia in deter-
mining the state border were evident, and intelligence services and pro-
paganda played an especially important role (Kosmač, 2017). With the
Paris Peace Treaties signed in 1947, Italy had to cede the entire eastern
Adriatic and most of Istria to Yugoslavia. The rest of the Istrian province
(north of the River Mirna), as well as the province of Trieste, became a
special sovereign State – the Free Territory of Trieste – under a provisional
regime of the Government (Bufon, 2008c; 2009b; Dukovski, 2010; Kos-
mač, 2017; Rogoznica, 2011; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of Amer-
⁷¹ D’Alessio (2012a) claims that this topic is abused and inflated. The number of civilian
victims in the Upper Adriatic was lower than in other areas where Tito’s army operated.
The problem of heterogeneity of empirical data in relation to the number of emigrants is
also highlighted by Hrobat Virloget (2015) and Šarić (2015).
⁷² Until the 1990s, the principle of silence prevailed in ‘Yugoslav Istria,’ but it was not com-
pletely different in Italy either, at least officially. In fact, serious discussions began after
the democratisation and collapse of the Second Yugoslavia. The Italian political propa-
ganda, political discussions, and litigations, as well as artistic creation (especially since
the 1990s) is marked as a ‘culture of foibe’ by Pirjevec et al. (2012, pp. 234–241). The final
report of the Slovene-Italian Historical and Cultural Commission – see Kacin-Wohinz
(2001) – which linked the issue of the foibe to irredentism, fascism, war, nationalisms
and communism, did not help stabilise the situation. However, less mythologisation is
observed on the Slovenian and Croatian sides. Nevertheless, the already mentioned ter-
minological differences related to fatalities as a reason for different interpretations – see
Burigo (2005, p. 316) – should not be neglected.
95
