Page 92 - Dark Shades of Istria
P. 92
Trans-Border Region of Istria
314) described this vividly as a tumultuous peasant uprising (against the
nazi-fascist regime).⁵⁵ After the liberation of Pazin (between 11 and 12
September), it became the centre of organisational, political and mili-
tary administration in the Croatian part of Istria. The then anti-fascists
persecuted the members of the failed fascist regime and other ‘enemies’
(especially class enemies, including the clergy, and not only Italians);
many left to retreat back to Italy or join the Nazi forces or the libera-
tion struggle in Istria. The arrests were followed by a brief interrogation,
(extra-judicial/military) proceedings usually led by a Communist party
delegate, confiscation and liquidation (often thrown in the foibe or mine
shafts); procedures were not prescribed/standardised. Personal disagree-
ments/disputes from the past were also resolved this way. Many times the
procedures were carried out without any control (Burigo, 2005; Cogoy,
2009, p. 14; Pirjevec et al., 2012; Scotti, 2008, pp. 74–79, 147) and mostly in
the case of the fascists, ‘convicts’ were taken directly to the execution site
(Scotti, 2008, p. 148). On the basis of some Italian historians’ claims, Ash-
brook (2006, p. 13) states that the executions in 1943 were spontaneous.⁵⁶
This violence aroused fear among residents, which consequently dimin-
ished confidence in the liberation struggle;⁵⁷ the leadership was aware of
this. A lack of Croatian patriotism was also detected (Scotti, 2008).⁵⁸ Pure
Croatian patriotism was manifested primarily by the so-called narodnjaci
(exponents of traditional Croatian patriotism or nationalism)⁵⁹ in central
Istria with a clear anti-Italian (Burigo, 2005, p. 313; Oblak Moscarda, 2016,
p. 133),⁶⁰ and later also with an anti-partisan/anti-communist, orientation
(Oblak Moscarda, 2016, pp. 51, 139–140; Veraja, 2013, p. 214); for some of
⁵⁵ It may sound offensive, but it is necessary to take into account that the quite underdevel-
oped rural area was populated by a majority Slavic rural population, which was less or
uneducated, without organisational and military knowledge/skills. Educated people (in-
voluntarily) emigrated earlier due to the fascist repression (Scotti, 2008); the exception
were Catholic priests.
⁵⁶ Executions in 1945 (mainly outside of Istria) were more deliberate and organised by Tito’s
army (Ashbrook, 2006).
⁵⁷ To avoid generalisations about collective guilt, Scotti (2008, pp. 204–209) cites names of
some ‘partisans’ who carried out atrocities – calling them ‘criminals of the five-pointed
star.’
⁵⁸ However, generalisation due to regional specificity is not completely appropriate.
⁵⁹ As a national movement, they have been fighting for national (Croatian) ideas since the
1830s, and this was/is often overlooked (especially during the socialist revolution).
⁶⁰ Operations of the communists were, in addition to the liberation struggle, more ideolog-
ically oriented and marked by cooperation with the Italian communists.
92
314) described this vividly as a tumultuous peasant uprising (against the
nazi-fascist regime).⁵⁵ After the liberation of Pazin (between 11 and 12
September), it became the centre of organisational, political and mili-
tary administration in the Croatian part of Istria. The then anti-fascists
persecuted the members of the failed fascist regime and other ‘enemies’
(especially class enemies, including the clergy, and not only Italians);
many left to retreat back to Italy or join the Nazi forces or the libera-
tion struggle in Istria. The arrests were followed by a brief interrogation,
(extra-judicial/military) proceedings usually led by a Communist party
delegate, confiscation and liquidation (often thrown in the foibe or mine
shafts); procedures were not prescribed/standardised. Personal disagree-
ments/disputes from the past were also resolved this way. Many times the
procedures were carried out without any control (Burigo, 2005; Cogoy,
2009, p. 14; Pirjevec et al., 2012; Scotti, 2008, pp. 74–79, 147) and mostly in
the case of the fascists, ‘convicts’ were taken directly to the execution site
(Scotti, 2008, p. 148). On the basis of some Italian historians’ claims, Ash-
brook (2006, p. 13) states that the executions in 1943 were spontaneous.⁵⁶
This violence aroused fear among residents, which consequently dimin-
ished confidence in the liberation struggle;⁵⁷ the leadership was aware of
this. A lack of Croatian patriotism was also detected (Scotti, 2008).⁵⁸ Pure
Croatian patriotism was manifested primarily by the so-called narodnjaci
(exponents of traditional Croatian patriotism or nationalism)⁵⁹ in central
Istria with a clear anti-Italian (Burigo, 2005, p. 313; Oblak Moscarda, 2016,
p. 133),⁶⁰ and later also with an anti-partisan/anti-communist, orientation
(Oblak Moscarda, 2016, pp. 51, 139–140; Veraja, 2013, p. 214); for some of
⁵⁵ It may sound offensive, but it is necessary to take into account that the quite underdevel-
oped rural area was populated by a majority Slavic rural population, which was less or
uneducated, without organisational and military knowledge/skills. Educated people (in-
voluntarily) emigrated earlier due to the fascist repression (Scotti, 2008); the exception
were Catholic priests.
⁵⁶ Executions in 1945 (mainly outside of Istria) were more deliberate and organised by Tito’s
army (Ashbrook, 2006).
⁵⁷ To avoid generalisations about collective guilt, Scotti (2008, pp. 204–209) cites names of
some ‘partisans’ who carried out atrocities – calling them ‘criminals of the five-pointed
star.’
⁵⁸ However, generalisation due to regional specificity is not completely appropriate.
⁵⁹ As a national movement, they have been fighting for national (Croatian) ideas since the
1830s, and this was/is often overlooked (especially during the socialist revolution).
⁶⁰ Operations of the communists were, in addition to the liberation struggle, more ideolog-
ically oriented and marked by cooperation with the Italian communists.
92
