Page 16 - Stati inu obstati, revija za vprašanja protestantizma, letnik XVII (2021), številka 34, ISSN 2590-9754
P. 16
razprave, študije, papers
Religious Moral Languages, Secularity, and Hermeneutical Injustice
As a philosophical approach to public moral discourse in a religiously plural socie-
ty, Jeffrey Stout’s “modest pragmatism” has received a mixed response from the op-
posite sides of the secularism debate. While many political theologians and com-
munitarians claim that Stout concedes too much to the secularists, some secularists
find Stout’s inclusive approach towards religious reasonings in public discourse all
too “theological.” This essay offers a re-examination and a further analysis of mod-
est pragmatism in the light of recent work in epistemology of democracy (especially
Anderson’s interpretation of Dewey’s inclusive and experimental democracy), and
discourse ethics based on Jose Medina’s theory of hermeneutical (in)justice. I ar-
gue that Stout’s normative vision of public moral discourse is persuasive only if cer-
tain principles which Stout either affirms or presupposes – a strong principle of reli-
gious freedom, a democratic principle of inclusion and a principle to settle disputes
discursively and non-violently – are placed in its centre and developed further than
they have been in Stout’s own work. This also means that I apply the aforementioned
theories – Medina’s theory of hermeneutical (in)justice in particular – to the ques-
tion which they do not address, namely: how can and should different religious lan-
guages be included in public moral deliberation? The result is a new and stronger
variant of the modest pragmatist vision of public moral discourse, and a renewed ar-
gument for a qualified secularity of such discourse.
Keywords: pragmatism, religion, secularism, religious freedom, ethics
»Zmerni pragmatizem« Jeffreyja Stouta (Stout 1990, 249–265; 2004,
251–259) je kot filozofski pristop k javnemu moralnemu diskurzu v
versko pluralni družbi naletel na mešane odzive z nasprotnih si stra-
ni razprave o sekularizmu. Na eni strani vplivni teologi in komunita-
ristični misleci trdijo, da Stout preveč popušča sekularistom. Stanley
Hauerwas,2 denimo, meni, da Stoutovi pritrditvi radikalni demokraci-
ji manjka verodostojna – in za Hauerwasa bistvena – zakoreninjenost
v teologiji, češ da Stout »želi ponoviti, kar jaz [sic!] govorim, ne da bi se
spoprijel s teološkimi vprašanji, ki jih on ne bi rad vzel med svoja prepri-
čanja« (Springs et al. 2010, 16). Po drugi strani se sekularistom Stoutov
vključujoč pristop k religioznim razpravam v javnem diskurzu zdi pre-
več teološki. Med drugimi je Richard Rorty, Stoutov sopragmatist, na-
sprotoval Stoutovim trditvam, »da med demokratičnimi ustanovami in
2 Dva druga krščanska komunitarista, s katerima se Stout podrobneje sooči v
Democracy and Tradition, sta Alasdair MacIntyre in John Milbank. Glej Stout
2004, 92–139.
224
Religious Moral Languages, Secularity, and Hermeneutical Injustice
As a philosophical approach to public moral discourse in a religiously plural socie-
ty, Jeffrey Stout’s “modest pragmatism” has received a mixed response from the op-
posite sides of the secularism debate. While many political theologians and com-
munitarians claim that Stout concedes too much to the secularists, some secularists
find Stout’s inclusive approach towards religious reasonings in public discourse all
too “theological.” This essay offers a re-examination and a further analysis of mod-
est pragmatism in the light of recent work in epistemology of democracy (especially
Anderson’s interpretation of Dewey’s inclusive and experimental democracy), and
discourse ethics based on Jose Medina’s theory of hermeneutical (in)justice. I ar-
gue that Stout’s normative vision of public moral discourse is persuasive only if cer-
tain principles which Stout either affirms or presupposes – a strong principle of reli-
gious freedom, a democratic principle of inclusion and a principle to settle disputes
discursively and non-violently – are placed in its centre and developed further than
they have been in Stout’s own work. This also means that I apply the aforementioned
theories – Medina’s theory of hermeneutical (in)justice in particular – to the ques-
tion which they do not address, namely: how can and should different religious lan-
guages be included in public moral deliberation? The result is a new and stronger
variant of the modest pragmatist vision of public moral discourse, and a renewed ar-
gument for a qualified secularity of such discourse.
Keywords: pragmatism, religion, secularism, religious freedom, ethics
»Zmerni pragmatizem« Jeffreyja Stouta (Stout 1990, 249–265; 2004,
251–259) je kot filozofski pristop k javnemu moralnemu diskurzu v
versko pluralni družbi naletel na mešane odzive z nasprotnih si stra-
ni razprave o sekularizmu. Na eni strani vplivni teologi in komunita-
ristični misleci trdijo, da Stout preveč popušča sekularistom. Stanley
Hauerwas,2 denimo, meni, da Stoutovi pritrditvi radikalni demokraci-
ji manjka verodostojna – in za Hauerwasa bistvena – zakoreninjenost
v teologiji, češ da Stout »želi ponoviti, kar jaz [sic!] govorim, ne da bi se
spoprijel s teološkimi vprašanji, ki jih on ne bi rad vzel med svoja prepri-
čanja« (Springs et al. 2010, 16). Po drugi strani se sekularistom Stoutov
vključujoč pristop k religioznim razpravam v javnem diskurzu zdi pre-
več teološki. Med drugimi je Richard Rorty, Stoutov sopragmatist, na-
sprotoval Stoutovim trditvam, »da med demokratičnimi ustanovami in
2 Dva druga krščanska komunitarista, s katerima se Stout podrobneje sooči v
Democracy and Tradition, sta Alasdair MacIntyre in John Milbank. Glej Stout
2004, 92–139.
224
